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ABSTRACT
The remarkable success of machine learning, especially deep learning, has pro-
duced a variety of cloud-based services for mobile users. Such services require an
end user to send data to the service provider, which presents a serious challenge to
end-user privacy. To address this concern, prior works either add noise to the data
or send features extracted from the raw data. They struggle to balance between
the utility and privacy because added noise reduces utility and raw data can be
reconstructed from extracted features.
This work represents a methodical departure from prior works: we balance be-
tween a measure of privacy and another of utility by leveraging adversarial learn-
ing to find a sweeter tradeoff. We design an encoder that optimizes against the
reconstruction error (a measure of privacy), adversarially by a Decoder, and the
inference accuracy (a measure of utility) by a Classifier. The result is RAN, a
novel deep model with a new training algorithm that automatically extracts fea-
tures for classification that are both private and useful.
It turns out that adversarially forcing the extracted features to only conveys the
intended information required by classification leads to an implicit regularization
leading to better classification accuracy than the original model which completely
ignores privacy. Thus, we achieve better privacy with better utility, a surprising
possibility in machine learning! We conducted extensive experiments on five pop-
ular datasets over four training schemes, and demonstrate the superiority of RAN
compared with existing alternatives.
1 INTRODUCTION
Today’s most robust and accurate models are boosted by deep learning techniques, which bene-
fit a lot of mobile intelligent services, such as speech-based assistant (e.g. Siri), face recognition
enabled phone-unlock (e.g. FaceID). However, the uncontrolled submission of raw sound, image,
and human activity data from mobile users to service provider has well-known privacy risks Abadi
et al. (2016). For example, the underlying correlation detection, re-identification and other malicious
mining Dwork et al. (2017); Bhatia et al. (2016). Different from pinning hopes on service providers
to anonymise data for privacy-preserving, we present to encode each piece of raw data in the end-
user side and only send the encoded data to the service provider. And the encoded data must be
both private and useful. Privacy can be quantified by the risk of sensitive raw data disclosure given
the encoded data. For classification services, utility can be quantified by the inference accuracy,
achieved by the service provider using a discriminative model.
Existing solutions addressing the privacy concern struggle to balance between above two seem-
ingly conflicting objectives: privacy vs. utility. An obvious and widely practiced solution to the
above problem is to transform the raw data into features and upload the features only, like Google
Now GoogleNow (2018); Google Cloud Machine Learning Engine also provides API to prepro-
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cess the raw data into engineering features before uploading GoogleCloud (2018). This solution
not only alleviates the privacy concern but also reduces the mobile data usage. However, it does
not provide any quantifiable privacy guarantee. It is well known that we can reconstruct the raw
data from the features Mahendran & Vedaldi (2015). As a result, Ossia et al. (2017) further apply
dimensionality reduction and add noise to the features before sending them to the service provider,
which unfortunately result in inference accuracy degradation.
Unlike previous work, we aim to systematically derive deep features for a sweeter tradeoff between
privacy and utility using deep neural networks, by leveraging adversarial training. Our key idea is
to judiciously combine generative learning, for maximizing reconstruction error, and discriminative
learning, for minimizing discriminative error. Specifically, we present Reconstructive Adversarial
Network (RAN), an end-to-end deep model with a new training algorithm. RAN controls two types
of descent gradients, i.e., reconstruction error and discriminative error, in back-propagation process
to guide the training of a feature extractor or Encoder.
Defining the exact adversarial attacker and finding the right measurement for privacy is an open
problem in itself Mendes & Vilela (2017). In this paper, we quantify Privacy using an intuitive
metric, i.e., the difficulty of reconstructing raw data via a generative model, or the reconstruction
error. In this case, the adversarial attacker is defined as a data reconstructor. Therefore, as shown in
Figure 2, a RAN consists of three parts: a feature extractor (Encoder), a utility discriminator (Clas-
sifier), and an adversarial reconstructor (Decoder). The output of the Encoder feeds to the input
of the Classifier and the Decoder. We envision the Encoder runs in mobile devices and processes
raw data into features. The Classifier runs in an untrusted platform, e.g. the cloud. A malicious
party can seek to reconstruct the raw data from the features using the Decoder. There is no theo-
retic guarantee on end-to-end training the colloborated discriminative model and generative model.
Therefore, we present a novel algorithm to train the RAN via an adversarial process, i.e., training
the Encoder with a Classifier first to improve intermediate features’ utility for discriminative tasks
and confronting the Encoder with an adversary Decoder to enhance the features’ privacy. All three
parts, Encoder, Classifier and Decoder, are iteratively trained using gradient descent. From the man-
ifold perspective, the two separate flows across RAN’s Encoder, Decoder and Classifier, i.e., decent
gradients of discrimination error and reconstruction error from the end of Classifier and Decoder
in back-propagation, guide the exact model parameter updating, which can iteratively derive the
privacy-specific and utility-imposed feature manifold.
Using MNIST LeCun (1998), CIFAR-10Krizhevsky et al. (2014), ImageNet Deng et al. (2009),
Ubisound Sicong et al. (2017) and Har UCI (2017) benchmark datasets, we show RAN is effective
in training an Encoder for end users to generate deep features that are both private and useful.
Surprisingly, we observe adversarial learned features to remove redundant information, for privacy,
even surpass the accuracy of the original model. Removing redundant information enhances the gen-
eralization. See § 3 and § A for more details. This better generalization is as auspicious illustration
that in practice, with machine learning, we can gain both utility and privacy at the same time.
In the rest of this paper, we elaborate RAN’s design in § 2 and evaluate the performance of RAN in
§ 3. We next review the related work in § 4 and conclude this work in § 5. We finally present the
theoretic interpretation of RAN in § 4.
2 DESIGN OF RAN
This section first formulates the privacy preserving problem, and then elaborates on RAN’s design.
2.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION OF MOBILE DATA PRIVACY PRESERVING
Many services exist today to analyze data from end users. In this work, we do not trust service
providers for the privacy of data: they could be malicious or subject to malicious exploits. For
example, as shown in Fig 1, an end user takes a picture of a product and send it to a cloud-based
service to find a place to purchase it, which is indeed a service Amazon provides. A lot of sensitive
information could accidentally come with the picture, such as personal information and user location
in the background.
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Figure 1: Framework of mobile data privacy preserving. Mobile users leverage the learned Encoder
to generate deep features from the raw data (i.e., ”tea bag” picture) before submit it. And the service
provider use the learned Classifier based on the received deep features, to recognize the object in the
picture and recommend a seller.
Our key insight is that most services actually do not need the raw data. Therefore, the mobile user
can encode raw data into features through a multi-layer Encoder (E) on the client side and only
deliver features to the service provider. Such features ideally should have following two properties:
Utility: contain enough essential information of raw data so that they are useful for the intended
service, e.g., high accuracy for object recognition; Privacy: it is hard to recover the original infor-
mation of raw data based on perturbed features through a reverse deep model Zhang et al. (2016).
2.2 UTILITY AND PRIVACY METRICS
In this work, we focus on classification services. Therefore, utility is quantified as the inference
accuracy of a discriminative model, employed by the service provider. Since defining the exact ad-
versarial attacker and finding the right measurement for privacy is an open problem in itself Mendes
& Vilela (2017), this paper quantifies privacy by an intuitive metric, i.e., the reconstruction error in
a reversed deep model, X , employed by a malicious party. The reconstruction error measures the
risk of original data disclosure. Since the Encoder is distributed to mobile users, we assume it is
available to both service providers and potential attackers. That is, both the service provider and the
malicious party can train their models using raw data and their corresponding Encoder output. As
such we can restate the desirable properties for the Encoder output as:
Utility: Max
E
prob(Y ′i = Yi), i ∈ T
Privacy: Max
E
Min
X
|Ii − I ′i|2, i ∈ T
(1)
where, prob(Y ′i = Yi) denotes the correct inference probability, i.e., accuracy, in the classification
service with the testing data T. Y ′i and Yi is the inference class and the true label, respectively.|Ii− I ′i|2 is the Euclidean distance, i.e., reconstruction error, between the raw data Ii and the mimic
data I ′i reconstructed by a malicious party with the Encoder output.
The first objective (Utility) is well-understood for discriminative learning. It can be achieved via a
standard optimization process, i.e., minimizing the cross entropy between the predicted label Y ′i and
ground truth Yi in a supervised manner Kruse et al. (2013). The inner part of the second objective,
Min
X
|Ii − I ′i|2, is also well-understood for generative learning. On the other hand, the outer part
Max
E
|Ii−I ′i|2 is the opposite, i.e., maximizing the reconstruction error. Therefore, the Encoder and
the reverse deep model employed by the malicious party (X) are adversarial to each other in their
optimization objectives.
Achieving above two objectives at the same time is challenging, since utility, i.e., maximized ac-
curacy, and privacy, i.e., maximized reconstruction error, are conflicting objectives to the feature
extractor, i.e., Encoder. When improving Utility, the Encoder must extract features to represent
the relevant essence of data; when improving Privacy, the Encoder can discard the utility-relevant
essence of the data. If not done properly, the Encoder output optimized for Utility leads to effective
data reconstruction by a reverse model and therefore poor Privacy Rifai et al. (2011).
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Figure 2: Architecture of reconstructive adversarial network (RAN).
2.3 ARCHITECTURE OF RAN
To tackle above challenges, we present RAN to train a feature extractor, i.e., Encoder, with good
trade-offs between privacy and utility. As shown in Fig 2, RAN employ two additional neural
network modules, Decoder (D) and Classifier (C), to train the Encoder (E). The Classifier simulates
the intended classification service; when RAN is trained by the service provider, the Classifier can
be the same discriminative model eventually used. The Decoder simulates a malicious attacker that
attempts to reconstruct the raw data from the Encoder output. All the three modules are end-to-end
trained to establish the Encoder (E) for end-users to extract deep features E(I) from raw data I .
The training is an iterative process that will be elaborated in §2.4. Below we first introduce RAN’s
neural network architecture, along with some empirically gained design insights.
• The Encoder (E) consists of an input layer, multiple convolutional layers, pooling layers,
and batch-normalization layers. We note that the clever usage of pooling layers and batch-
normalization layers contribute to deep feature’s utility and privacy. The batch-normalization
layer helps the features’ utility because it normalize the activation to avoid being too high or too
low thus has an regularization affect Ioffe & Szegedy (2015). It contributes to features’ privacy as
well since it is hard for Decoder to recover detail information from normalized features. And then,
the max-pooling layer is helpful to enhance feature’s privacy, because none of un-pooling tech-
niques can recover fine details from size-reduced features through shifting small parts to precisely
arrange them into a larger meaningful structure Milletari et al. (2016).
• The Decoder (D) is a usual Encoder turned upside down, composed of multiple un-pooling lay-
ers Mahendran & Vedaldi (2015) and deconvolutional layers Zeiler et al. (2010). We note that the
use of Decoder in training Encoder is to simulate a malicious party. After obtaining a (binary)
version of the Encoder, a malicious party is free to explore any neural architectures to reconstruct
the raw data. In this paper, we choose a worst possible Decoder, i.e., an exactly layer-to-layer re-
versed architecture to mirror the Encoder. That is, we assume a powerful adversarial Decoder that
knows the Encoder’s operations and connections in training. We also note that the architecture
and training algorithm of RAN can easily incorporate other architectures as the Decoder.
• the Classifier (C) builds a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) to process deep features and output in-
ference results with several full-connected layers Kruse et al. (2013). As we noted for the Decoder
above, a service provider can explore any neural architectures for its discriminative model, given
the Encoder. The reason we choose this specific architecture to train the Encoder is because some
of the most successful CNN architectures, e.g. VGG and AlexNet, which can be viewed as as the
Encoder plus the Classifier of our choice.
2.4 TRAINING ALGORITHM OF RAN
Our goal with RAN is to train an Encoder that can produce output that is both useful, i.e., leading to
high inference accuracy when used for classification tasks, and private, i.e., leading to high recon-
structive error when reverse engineered by an attacker. As we noted in §2.1, these two objectives can
be competing when taken naively. The key idea of RAN’s training algorithm is to train the Encoder
along with the Classifier and the Decoder, which simulate the service provider and a malicious at-
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Algorithm 1: Mini-batch stochastic training of reconstructive adversarial network (RAN)
Input: Dataset T
Output: RAN’s Weights {θe, θd, θc}
1 Initialize θe, θd, θc ;
2 for n epochs do
3 Sample mini-batch I of m samples from T;
4 for k steps do
5 Update θe and θc by gradient ascent with learning rate l1: minimize Od ;
6 Update θd by gradient ascent with learning rate l2: minimize Og ;
7 end
8 Update θe and θc by gradient ascent with learning rate l3: minimize Oa ;
9 end
10 *Note: n and k are two important hyper-parameters
tacker, respectively. Given a training dataset T of m pairs of I, the raw data, and Y, the true label,
we train a RAN through an iterative process with three stages:
1. Discriminative training maximizes the accuracy in Classifier; mathematically, it minimizes
the cross entropy H between predicted class C(E(Ii)) and true label Yi:
Od =
m∑
i=1
H(Yi − C(E(Ii))). (2)
2. Generative training minimizes the reconstructive error by the Decoder:
Og =
m∑
i=1
|Ii −D(E(Ii))|2 (3)
3. Adversarial training finds a tradeoff point between utility and privacy:
Oa =
m∑
i=1
λH |Yi − C(E(Ii))| − (1− λ)|Ii −D(E(Ii))|2 (4)
It is essentially a Lagrangian function of the objectives of the first two stages. λ is the
Lagrange multiplier that can be used to balance between utility and privacy.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the three-stage training algorithm. And we leverage mini-batch techniques
to balance the training robustness and efficiency (line 3) Li et al. (2014). Within each epoch, we first
perform the discrminative and generative stages (line 5, 6) to initialize model weights. And then,
we perform the adversarial stage (line 8) to seek a balance between utility and privacy. We note that
k in line 4 is a hyper-parameter of first two stages. These k steps followed by a single iteration of
the third stage is trying to synchronize the convergence speed of these three training stages well,
borrowing existing techniques in generative adversarial network Goodfellow et al. (2014). Our
implementation uses an overall optimized value, k = 3, through comparing several discrete options.
And we leverage the AdamOptimizer Kingma & Ba (2014) with an adaptive learning rate for all
three stages (line 5, 6 and 8).
3 EVALUATION
In this section, we first compare RAN’s performance on privacy-utility tradeoff with three baselines
and then visualize the utility and privacy of resulting Encoder output.
Evaluation tasks and models. We evaluate RAN, especially the resulting Encoder, with five pop-
ular classification services. Specifically, RAN is evaluated for hand-written digit recognition (T1:
MNIST LeCun (1998)), image classification (T2: CIFAR-10 Krizhevsky et al. (2014), T3: Ima-
geNet Deng et al. (2009)), acoustic event sensing (T4: UbiSound Sicong et al. (2017)), and the
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accelerometer and gyroscope data based human activity recognition (T5: Har UCI (2017)). Ac-
cording to the sample size, the LeNet is selected as the neural architectures of RAN’s Encoder plus
Classifier for T1, T4 and T5, while AlexNet and VGG-16 are chosen for T2 and T3, respectively.
To assume a powerful adversary that knows the Encoder in the training, the RAN’s Decoder exactly
mirrors its Encoder for each task in the training.
3.1 UTILITY VS. PRIVACY TRADEOFFS
This experiment illustrates the superiority of RAN compared with three state-of-the-art data privacy
preserving baselines. It does so with five tasks (T1, T2, T3, T4, T5). However, due to space limit we
do not show the results for CIFAR-10 because they are similar to those for ImageNet.
• Noisy Data (Noisy) method perturbs the raw data, through adding random Laplace noise to the
raw data I and then submit the noisy data I to the service provider. This is a typical local dif-
ferential privacy method He & Cai (2017); Dwork et al. (2010). The utility of noisy data is the
inference accuracy in a standard deep model, and its privacy is evaluated by the information loss
metric, i.e., |I − I|2.
• DNN method encodes the raw data into deep features, using a DNN based encoder (e.g. the con-
volutional and pooling layers of LeNet, AlexNet, VGG), and only deliver deep features to the
service provider GoogleCloud (2018); GoogleNow (2018). Its privacy is tested by the reconstruc-
tion error in a Deconvolutional model (mirrors of the encoder), and the the accuracy evaluates the
utility in a DNN based classifier (e.g. the fully-connected layers of LeNet, AlexNet, VGG).
• DNN(resized) method further perturbs above deep features through principal components anal-
ysis and Laplace noise injection, and then deliver the perturbed deep features to the service
provider Ossia et al. (2017). Its privacy and utility are also tested by the deep model based
decoder and classifier, same with that in the DNN baseline.
• RAN automatically transform the raw data into features, i.e., Encoder output, and then deliver
them to the service provider. The privacy of RAN’s Encoder output is tested by the reconstruction
error in a separately trained decoder, which is taught based on the binary version (input and
output) of the trained RAN’s Encoder, to simulate a malicious attacker. And its utility is tested by
the inference accuracy in RAN’s Classifier.
The DNN method provides a high utility standard, and the Noisy and DNN(resized) methods set a
strict benchmark for RAN.
Figure 3 summarises the Pareto front of the testing privacy-utility tradeoff by using three base-
lines and RAN. In this thread of experiments, we inject various noise factor {0.1, 0.2, ...0.9}
into each piece of testing data to test the trained Noisy and DNN(resized) baselines, which are
both noise related methods. And we test RAN models which are trained under several settings
{0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.9} of the Lagrange multiplier λ in Eq.4, to recover its tradeoff trends. First, we see
RAN’s Encoder output achieves the most stable privacy-utility tradeoff with a constrictive range,
compared to those encoded by other three baselines. Second, RAN’s Encoder output achieves the
best overall utility than other three baselines. Specifically, RAN’s output privacy (utility) is ≥ 95%
on MNIST, Ubisound and Har, ≥ 85% on ImageNet, and ≥ 76% on CIFAR-10, with the proper
λ setups, which is even larger than that of the original deep model (see DNN baseline). While
the accuracy in Noisy and DNN(resized) baselines is unstable, ranging from 20% to 93%. Third,
RAN’s output can attain the higher privacy than usual deep features in a traditional DNN, and guar-
antee competitive privacy compared to others. Moreover, the RAN’s privacy quantified by RAN’s
Decoder (the green dashed line in Figure 3) is averagely larger than that measured by a third-party
Decoder (green triangles in Figure 3) which is trained given the binary version of RAN’s Encoder.
Summary. Overall, RAN outperforms other three baselines to attain a better privacy-utility tradeoff
over five recognition tasks. Second, the features derived by the proposed learning algorithm to
remove redundant (sensitive) information, for privacy, even surpass the accuracy of the original
model. We refer readers to § 4 for how and why it works from a theoretical perspective. We
also note that the regularization parameter λ in RAN can be further systematically fine-tuned, e.g.,
exponentially varied using reinforcement learning, so that discovers a better privacy-utility tradeoff.
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Noisy    DNN    DNN(resized) RAN
(a) Digit(MNIST)
Noisy    DNN    DNN(resized) RAN
(b) Image(ImageNet)
Noisy    DNN    DNN(resized) RAN
(c) Sound(UbiSound)
Noisy    DNN    DNN(resized) RAN
(d) Activity (Har)
Figure 3: Performance comparison of RAN with three baselines on four datasets (MNIST, Ima-
geNet, UbiSound and Har). Y-axis is the test reconstruction error, normalized by log operation. And
X-axis represents the utility (accuracy).
DNN
Ubisound HarImageNet
RAN
MNIST
Figure 4: 3D visualization of the highly separable features learned by standard DNN and RAN’s
Encoder output in the feature space. Different color in each figure standards for one class.
3.2 UTILITY VISUALIZATION OF RAN’S ENCODER OUTPUT
To illustrate the utility of RAN’s Encoder output, we visualize how the distribution of RAN’s En-
coder output varies from traditional Depp features. First, as shown in Figure 4, RAN’s Encoder
output are highly separable, in the feature space, similar to the deep features from traditional DNN.
It reflects the utility for subsequent classification. Second, to zoom in on two categories of images
for more details in Figure 5, we see that RAN pushes the features towards the constrictive space
dominant dominated by the data without redundant information, i.e., ”sailboat without water” and
”car without road”. While the traditional DNN may capture the background ”water” and ”road”
information to help the classification of ”sailboat” and ”car”.
Summary. First, RAN’s Encoder output is highly separable in feature space as standard DNN do,
which indicates the high utility for the subsequent classification tasks. Second, the learning algo-
rithm on RAN pushes features towards essential information and away from redundant background
(sensitive) information (see more interpretations in § 4).
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Sailboat without water
Sailboat with water
Car without road
Car with road+
+
Sailboat Sailboat
Car
Car
RAN DNN
Figure 5: Zoom in on two categories, i.e., sailboat and car in the feature space.
Raw RANDNNNoisy
Image 1
Image 2
DNN(resized)
Figure 6: From left to right: raw image from ImageNet (Raw), image with Laplace noise (Noisy),
images reconstructed from DNN’s features, resized DNN’s features, and RAN’s Encoder output.
3.3 VISUALIZING OF RAN’S PRIVACY
In this experiment, we visualize the privacy of RAN’s Encoder output, i.e. private features, in
comparison to other approaches, using two example images from ImageNet. Figure 6 illustrates the
pixel image of the raw data, the noisy data, the mimic data reconstructed from DNN’s deep feature,
and mimic data reconstructed from RAN’s private features from two ”bus” images from ImageNet
datasets. We can find that the image reconstructed by RAN’s Decoder are dramatically corrupted
and hard to distinguish the exact information of raw images. As mentioned in § 3.1, the RAN’s
Decoder is more potent than a separately trained Decoder on reconstructing RAN’s hidden features.
Summary. First, the corrupted reconstructed images byRAN certify the improved privacy ofRAN’s
Encoder output. Second, the reconstructed images from DNN’s features recover both object (bus)
and background (road) information, while RAN’s Encoder tries to contain object information and
remove background information. And then RAN leads better privacy and utility (generalization) to
its hidden features. More interpretation is in § 4.
4 MANIFOLD BASED INTERPRETATION
We resort to the manifold perspective of the deep model. It is common in literature to assume that
the high-dimensional raw data lies on a lower dimensional manifold, refers to latent variables Chien
& Chen (2016). A DNN can also be viewed as a parametric manifold learner utilizing the nonlinear
mapping with multi-layer architecture and connection weights.
We decompose the input data I into two orthogonal lower dimensional manifolds:
I = IOD + IOD⊥ (5)
Here, the component IOD is the ideal manifold component that is both necessary and sufficient
for object detection. Thus, ideally, we want our training algorithm to rely on this information for
object detection solely. Formally, for the discriminative classifier, this implies that prob(Y |I) =
8
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prob(Y |IOD). And the other manifold component IOD⊥ , orthogonal to IOD, may or may not contain
information for the object class, but it is dispensable for object detection. In practice, the real data
does have redundant correlations. Thus IOD⊥ may be learned for object detection, but unnecessary.
However, revealing IOD⊥ is likely to contain sensitive information thus hurt the privacy. If we assume
that there does exist a sweet-spot trade-off between utility and privacy, that we hope to find, then it
must be the case that IOD is not sensitive (as it is necessary and sufficient).
The features F learned by standard deep learning algorithms to minimize the training error based
on information from I , will mostly likely overlap (non-zero projection) with both IOD and IOD⊥ .
And the overlap with IOD⊥ compromises the privacy (as evident from our experiments). Apart from
privacy, the redundant correlation in IOD⊥ is also likely only be spurious in training data. Thus,
merely minimizing training loss can lead to over-fitting.
This is where we can shoot two stones via an adversarial process. In RAN, the Encoder is trained by
utility-specified discriminative learning objective (Eq.(2)) and privacy-imposed adversarial learning
objective (Eq.(4)), to find features F ′ as shown in Figure 7. The manifold I ′ formulated by paramet-
ric Encoder is forced by discriminative learning objective (Eq.(2)), just like the traditional approach,
to contain information from both IOD as well as IOD⊥ . However, the adversarial training objective
(Eq(4)) will push features F ′ away (or orthogonal) from IOD⊥ . In this way, we get privacy as well,
since F ′ as a function of I which has two manifolds, being orthogonal to IOD⊥ forces it to only
depend on IOD.
Discriminative learningargmin𝐻(𝑌, 𝑌′)
Component 𝐼./Adversarial learningargm𝑎𝑥 |𝐼 − 𝐼′|4
+ ++
+
+
+
+ +
++
++
* * *
*
*
*
*
*
**
*
*
+
+
+
* * * Sensitive component 𝐼5./
Figure 7: A new manifold pushed by RAN to form the feature extractor, i.e., Encoder, for utility and
privacy. The utility-specified discriminative learning objective (Eq.(2)) push it to contain IOD and
IOD⊥ , and the privacy-imposed adversarial training objective (Eq(4)) pushes it away from sensitive
component IOD⊥ .
Meanwhile, from a generalization perspective, in the training data, the spurious information from
IOD⊥ that might over-fit the training data is iteratively removed by the adversarial training objective
(Eq.(4)) automatically leading to enhanced generalization. For example, as shown in Figure 6, if
we want to discriminate between ”bus” and ”sailboat”, the ”road” in the picture can help, but it is
obviously a bad way of classifying and may not generalize if the test image contains ”bus” without
the ”road”. However, ”road” maybe most of the background and retain some information to ease
image reconstruction, which is unintended. Adding noise will obfuscate both ”road” and ”bus”,
compromising object detection at the cost of privacy. The RAN, instead, will only obfuscate ”road”,
making reconstruction impossible without compromising the utility. In fact, RAN will get increased
utility due to better generalization.
This is an auspicious illustration that in machine learning we can gain both utility and privacy in
practice. A rigorous formalism and study of this phenomena could be an independent field in itself.
5 RELATED WORK
Our work is closely related to the following categories of research.
Privacy Preserving for Mobile Data: Unlike the typical privacy preserving techniques which are
adopted by data collectors (service providers) to release data for public data mining, RAN keeps
the raw data under end-user’s control, i.e., the the user submits private features only, rather than
raw data, to service providers. For example, randomized noise addition He & Cai (2017) and Dif-
ferential privacy Dwork et al. (2014); Abadi et al. (2016) techniques have been widely used by
service providers to anonymize/remove personally identifiable information or only releases statis-
tical information to publicly release datasets. RAN outperforms Noisy data (a differential privacy
9
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method) with better classification utility and competitive privacy (§ 3.1), because RAN’s Encoder is
end-to-end trained with collaborative utility-specified deep learning and privacy-imposed adversarial
learning for a good trade-off between features utility and privacy.
Privacy Preserving with Deep Learning: Generally, prior works adopt two classes of approaches
to protect end-user’s raw data: the end user modifies raw data before delivering them to service
providers Ossia et al. (2017) or multiple end users cooperate to learn a global data mining results,
without revealing their individual raw data Li et al. (2017). However, these segmented systematic
methods inevitably incur utility drops in subsequent recognition tasks. We has compared RAN with
resized noisy deep features according to Ossia et al. (2017) (§3.1), and concluded RAN achieves a
better utility against altering raw data into resized deep features. This is because RAN’s Encoder is
also trained along with a accuracy discriminator (Classifier) to guarantee utility.
Deep Feature Learning Techniques: In order to generate special features to facilitate the subse-
quent classification utility and protect raw data’s sensitive information from recovering by generative
models, RAN is the first to present an end-to-end deep architecture to sidestep the black-box of col-
laborative discriminative and generative learning via an end-to-end adversarial process. Today’s
extensions of discriminative models, generative models, or both, have been studied to seek latent
feature variables, which contributes to inference accuracy but incurs easy data reconstruction by re-
verse techniques Radford et al. (2015); Zhong et al. (2016). And some components used in existing
generative models, such as sensitivity penalty in contractive autoencoder Rifai et al. (2011), data
probability distribution in generative adversarial network Goodfellow et al. (2014) and KL diver-
gence in variational autoencoder Doersch (2016), can be further integrated into RAN’s framework
to define and enhance application-based privacy.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper presents to establish a deep model for mobile data contributor, i.e., mobile users, to en-
code the raw data into perturbed features before delivering it to the data collector or miner, i.e.,
service provider. To realize it, we present RAN, a novel deep model for private and useful fea-
ture transforming. RAN is the first to not only maximize feature’s classification accuracy but also
maximize its reconstruction error via an end-to-end adversarial training process. In particular, RAN
consists an Encoder for feature extracting, a Decoder for data reconstruction error (privacy) quan-
tification from Encoder output and a Classifier for accuracy (utility) discrimination. The proposed
training algorithm upon RAN’s contains three phase: discriminative learning function on Encoder
and Classifier to boost their discriminative abilities, a generative stage on Decoder to improve its data
generative capacity which stand in the position of Encoder’s adversary, and an adversarial stage on
Encoder, Classifier and Decoder to achieve our design objectives. Evaluations on five widely used
datasets show that RAN’s Encoder output attains a notable privacy-utility tradeoff. In the future,
we plan to investigate finer-grained manifold learning techniques on RAN for feature generalization
and privacy improvements.
A few aspects of RAN do invite further research. First, the RAN framework and the training algo-
rithm can accommodate different choices of privacy quantification, especially application-specific
ones. For example, we could measure the privacy by the hidden failure, i.e., the ratio between the
background patterns that were discovered based on RANs Encoder output, and the sensitive patterns
founded from the raw data, in an object recognition task. Second, the training of two adversaries
in RAN’s, i.e., Encoder and Decoder, must be synchronized well to avoid model degradation. It is
because of the convergence diversity of Encoder and Decoder. Therefore, some more efforts are
needed in RAN, e.g. setting proper iteration steps k and learning rate.
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